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This article reviews recent developments and changes in legisla-
tion, case law, and Virginia Supreme Court Rules affecting civil lit-
igation. The scope of the paper does not extend to criminal proce-
dure or topics unique to equity practice.
II. NONSUITS
A. Wrongful Death Actions
The most controversial issue in the area of civil procedure this
year was whether the general nonsuit statute 1 and the tolling pro-
visions of section 8.01-229(E)(3) 2 of the Code of Virginia ("Code")
apply to wrongful death actions.
The tolling provisions of section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code pro-
vide that when a plaintiff takes a nonsuit under section 8.01-380,
he may refile his action either within six months from the date he
took the nonsuit, or within the remainder of the original limitation
period, whichever is longer.
In Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, Inc.,3 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a wrongful death action, which is
purely a creature of statute,4 is not subject to the tolling provisions
of section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code. Rather, wrongful death ac-
tions are governed by the specific, particularized statute of limita-
tions and tolling provisions set out in section 8.01-244(B) of the
Code as it existed prior to recent amendment.5 The Dodson court
* Member, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, Norfolk, Va.; B.A., 1971, Virginia Military
Institute; J.D., 1976, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
** Associate, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, Norfolk, Va.; B.A., 1981, University of
Virginia; J.D., 1985, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
2. Id. § 8.01-229(E)(3).
3. 241 Va. 89, 400 S.E.2d 178 (1991).
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-50 to 8.01-56 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
5. Former § 8.01-244(B) of the Code provided:
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unanimously affirmed the dismissal of two wrongful death actions
where the plaintiffs had taken nonsuits and then refiled their ac-
tions before the two-year wrongful death limitation period expired,
but not within the six months specified in the statute.
In response to Dodson, the General Assembly passed an amend-
ment to section 8.01-244(B) of the Code which allows a plaintiff in
a wrongful death action to recommence his action either within six
months from taking the nonsuit or within the remaining statutory
period, whichever is longer.7
The drafters of the amendment, which became effective July 1,
1991, stated that the provisions were "declaratory of the original
intent of the General Assembly in enacting Chapter 617 of the
1977 Acts of Assembly," which includes section 8.01-244 of the
Code.8 This "declaration of original intent" language has been con-
strued as the General Assembly's attempt to make the revised act
retroactive to actions time-barred under the Dodson rule.
The passage of the new tolling provisions for wrongful death ac-
tions prompted plaintiffs in four cases to attempt to revive time-
barred wrongful death actions in the circuit courts. Unsuccessful in
the circuit courts, these plaintiffs filed petitions for appeal with the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The supreme court, by order of July
31, 1991, refused all four petitions for appeal. 9
In denying the petitions for appeal, the supreme court stated
that the respective circuit courts had properly held that the tolling
Every action under § 8.01-50 shall be brought by the personal representative of the
decedent within two years after the death of the injured person. If any such action is
brought within such period of two years after such person's death and for any cause
abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of such action, the time such
action is pending shall not be counted as any part of such period of two years and
another action may be brought within the remaining period of such two years as if
such former action had not been instituted.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-244(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1991). As of July 1, 1991, the
following provision was added to § 8.01-244(B): "[h]owever if a plaintiff suffers a voluntary
nonsuit pursuant to § 8.01-380, the nonsuit shall not be deemed an abatement nor a dismis-
sal pursuant to this subsection, and the provisions of subdivision (E)(3) of § 8.01-229 shall
apply to such a nonsuited action." Id. § 8.01-244(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
6. Dodson, 241 Va. at 95, 400 S.E.2d at 181.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-244(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991); see supra note 5.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-244(B) (ed. note).
9. Brewer v. Miller, No,. 910638 (City of Norfolk Cir. Ct. writ denied July 31, 1991);
Flanagan v. Virginia Beach Gen. Hosp., No. 910586 (City of Va. Beach Cir. Ct. writ denied
July 31, 1991); Hendrix v. Children's Hosp. of the King's Daughters, No. 910587 (City of
Norfolk Cir. Ct. writ denied July 31, 1991); Peppers v. Anthony, No. 910831 (County of
Chesterfield Cir. Ct. writ denied July 31, 1991).
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provisions of the nonsuit statute were inapplicable to these wrong-
ful death actions because section 8.01-244(B), as it read prior to
the amendments effective July 1, 1991, controlled. 10 However, the
court did not address the "declaration of original intent" language
of the new tolling provisions of section 8.01-244.
B. Nonsuits and Rule 3:3(c)
Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington National, Inc.,1 laid to
rest the apparent conflict between Rule 3:3 of the Rules of Su-
preme Court of Virginia 2 and the nonsuit statute. 3 Rule 3:3(c) re-
quires dismissal of an action if the defendant is not served within
one year of the action being filed, unless the plaintiff can show that
he exercised "due diligence" when attempting service. 4
Section 8.01-380(A) of the Code entitles the plaintiff to take a
nonsuit as to any cause of action either "before a motion to strike
the evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires from the
bar or before the action has been submitted to the court for deci-
sion."1 - 5 In addition, section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code provides
that a plaintiff who has nonsuited may refile his action either
within six months or the period remaining under the applicable
statute of limitations, whichever period is longer. 6 This section
also tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of the first
action.
In Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington National, Inc.,' 7 the
plaintiff filed suit on the eve of the expiration of the statute of
limitations, delayed service for one year, nonsuited the first suit,
and then re-filed a new case on the same claim within six months
of the nonsuit. After being served in the second case, the defend-
ant filed a plea asserting that the plaintiff's claim was barred by
Rule 3:3(c). The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the
plaintiff's motion for judgment with prejudice.' 8
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court. In its de-
10. Id.
11. 238 Va. 506, 385 S.E.2d 847 (1989).
12. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3:3(c).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
14. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3:3(c).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
16. Id. § 8.01-229(E)(3).
17. 238 Va. 506, 385 S.E.2d 847 (1989).
18. Id. at 508, 385 S.E.2d at 847.
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cision, the court attempted to resolve the "rule-statute dichotomy"
created by the dismissal language in Rule 3:3(c) and the nonsuit
statute. 9 Thecourt held that section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code
tolled the statute of limitations during pendency of the first action;
but because the defendant was not served in a timely fashion,
"Rule 3:3 forbade entry of any judgment" against him in that ac-
tion. Thus, the plaintiff terminated the first action by nonsuit pur-
suant to section 8.01-380 of the Code, and then as dictated by sec-
tion 8.01-229(E) (3).20
In the Clark case, the supreme court resolved the conflict be-
tween section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code and Rule 3:3(c) by hold-
ing, in effect, that when a nonsuit is taken, the dismissal mandated
by Rule 3:3(c) is without prejudice. However, the supreme court
has dismissed a case with prejudice under Rule 3:3(c). This oc-
curred where the plaintiff had obtained a default judgment
through what was found to be ineffective service on the defendant.
In Dennis v. Jones,2 ' the plaintiff filed an affidavit with the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) claiming that the defendant
was a nonresident, and thus served process on the DMV as statu-
tory agent for the defendant.22 However, the defendant was not a
non-resident, she had merely moved to another part of town. The
court held that the plaintiff failed to use the diligence required for
service under section 8.01-316 since the plaintiff could have easily
ascertained the defendant's address. As a result, the court ruled
the default judgment void and dismissed the suit with prejudice.23
C. Nonsuits and Dispositive Motions
At least one circuit court has held that where a demurrer is sus-
tained and the trial court has granted leave to amend the motion
for judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to take a nonsuit at any time
up until the case is submitted to the court after an argumentary
motion to dismiss, even if the deadline for filing the amended
pleadings has expired.2 Although this case had indisputably been
19. 238 Va. at 511, 385 S.E.2d at 849.
20. Id. at 511-512, 385 S.E.2d at 849-850.
21. 240 Va. 12, 393 S.E.2d 390 (1990).
22. Id. at 18, 393 S.E.2d at 393.
23. Id. at 19-20, 393 S.E.2d at 394.
24. Chandler v. Signet Bank/Va., 20 Va. Cir. 447 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990). The
opinion in this case contains an interesting discussion of Wells v. Lorcum House Condomin-
iums' Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 381 (1989); City of Hopewell v. Cogar,
237 Va. 264, 377 S.E.2d 385 (1989); and Khanna v. Dominion Bank, 237 Va. 242, 377 S.E.2d
[Vol. 25:663666
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"submitted to the court for decision" under section 8.01-380(A) of
the Code, the court allowed the plaintiff to take a nonsuit, reason-
ing that it had ruled on the demurrer in such a manner that the
plaintiff's claims remained pending.25 Furthermore, a second cir-
cuit court has held that a plaintiff can take a nonsuit after a com-
missioner's report, and exceptions to it have been filed.26
Additionally, in a medical malpractice action, the supreme court
held that when the plaintiff has improperly filed the original suit,
within ninety days of the notice of claim, and the defendant has
responded with a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff may suffer a vol-
untary nonsuit and recommence her claim within six months pur-
suant to section 8.01-229(E)(3) of the Code.
In Homeowners Warehouse, Inc. v. Rawlings,2 s presently on ap-
peal, the supreme court will decide whether the case had been
"submitted to the court for decision."2 9 During the trial, the de-
fendant moved to strike the plaintiff's evidence in open court; the
court then heard full argument on the motion and retired to con-
sider its decision. The court returned sometime later to announce
its decision to grant the motion to strike. While the trial judge was
explaining the court's rationale, the plaintiff's counsel motioned
for a nonsuit. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion before
actually announcing its ruling on the motion to strike.30
III. VENUE
Section 8.01-265 of the Code now permits the court, upon mo-
tion of the defendant, to dismiss an action without prejudice upon
determining that a more convenient forum exists outside of Vir-
ginia. This occurs where the alternate forum has jurisdiction over
all the parties, the plaintiff is a non-resident, and the cause of ac-
tion arose outside of Virginia.31 Upon granting a motion to dismiss
under this statute, the court must impose a condition which pro-
378 (1989). These three cases were decided on the same day and interpreted the "submitted
to the court for decision" language of § 8.01-380(A) of the Code.
25. Chandler, 20 Va. Cir. at 452.
26. Nelson-White Constr. Mfg. Corp. v. Foster, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 345 (County of Chester-
field Cir. Ct. 1989).
27. Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990).
28. Record No. 901353 (City of Va. Beach Cir. Ct. argued June 3, 1991).
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
30. Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Homeowners Warehouse, Inc. v. Rawlings, Record No.
901353 (June 3, 1991).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:663
hibits the defendant from raising the statute of limitations to bar
the action in the new forum. This section applies only to actions
filed after July 1, 1991.32
If a plaintiff recommences an action in an improper venue after
suffering a nonsuit, section 8.01-380(A) of the Code specifies that
the case is not to be dismissed, but rather, is to be transferred to
the proper venue. Section 8.01-264(D) of the Code grants the
trial court judge the authority to transfer suits for divorce or an-
nulment to the proper venue sua sponte 4
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Williams,3 the supreme
court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused
to grant the defendant's motion to transfer a personal injury case
to the forum where the accident occurred. The court found that
the venue where the case was filed was "proper" because the rail-
road conducted business there. However, because that forum had
"no practical nexus whatsoever" with the plaintiff's action, the
court concluded that the case should have been transferred to a
more convenient forum under section 8.01-265 of the Code.3
While the plaintiff generally has the discretion to file suit in a
permissible venue, once he has filed the action he cannot request a
transfer of venue to a more convenient forum. Additionally, a
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265. Former § 8.01-265 of the Code, which prohibited dismissal
of actions from a permissible venue when a more convenient forum existed outside the state,
was held to be constitutionally sound. See Caldwell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 238 Va. 148, 380
S.E.2d 910 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1169 (1990).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
34. Id. § 8.01-264(D).
35. 239 Va. 390, 389 S.E.2d 714 (1990) (plaintiff, a railroad employee injured while work-
ing in an office in Roanoke, brought an FELA action in Portsmouth where the railroad
conducted business).
36. Id. at 396, 389 S.E.2d 717-718. Williams was followed in Grubbs v. Southern Ry. Co.,
19 Va. Cir. 367 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990); Virginia Radiology Ass'n v. Culpeper Me-
morial Hosp., 21 Va. Cir. 157 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990); Slone v. Hickcock, 20 Va.
Cir. 325 (City of Roanoke Cir. Ct. 1990); Nales v. Southern Ry. Co., 20 Va. Cir. 393 (City of
Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990). Williams is discussed in Dominion Leasing Corp. v. Bella Pasta,
Ltd., 20 Va. Cir. 331 (City of Roanoke Cir. Ct. 1990) (where the court gave effect to forum
selection clauses contained in the contracts sued upon); Honeycutt v. Southern Ry. Co., 21
Va. Cir. 427 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990) (forum to which defendant sought transfer
held no more inconvenient than the plaintiff's chosen forum); see also Thompson v. Robert-
shaw Controls Co., 19 Va. Cir. 370 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990); Marshall v. Frawner, 19
Va. Cir. 258 (County of Albemarle Cir. Ct. 1990).
37. Compare Ellis v. Robertson, 18 Va. Cir. 417 (County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990)
with Branmer v. State Highway Comm'r, 2 Va. Cir. 18 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1980)
(where the court granted plaintiff's motion to transfer to a "preferred venue" under § 8.01-
261 of the Code).
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motion objecting to venue cannot be made on an appeal to the cir-
cuit court, where no such motion was made in the general district
court.38
IV. APPEALS
Rule 5:25 of the Supreme Court of Virginia provides that the
supreme court will not sustain error to any ruling of the trial court
unless "the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling."39 While formal exceptions to rulings or orders
are unnecessary, section 8.01-384 of the Code requires that at the
time the ruling or order is made or sought, the party must inform
the court of the action which he desires the court to take, or of his
objections and the grounds therefor.40
When interpreting Rule 5:25 and section 8.01-384 of the Code,
the supreme court has held that where a party has endorsed a final
order as "Seen," yet fails to make further objection or endorse-
ment, there is not sufficient action to preserve the party's right to
appeal. 41 However, the supreme court reached a different conclu-
sion in Weidman v. Babcock.42 In Weidman, the plaintiff's counsel
endorsed as "SEEN" an order sustaining the defendant's motion
to dismiss.4 3 During the twenty-one day period after the order was
entered, the plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing, which the court
denied. The order denying the motion for rehearing was endorsed
"SEEN: and all Exceptions noted. '44 The supreme court found
that the "all Exceptions noted" language on the final order, cou-
pled with the plaintiff repeatedly making his position known to the
trial court during, oral argument on the motion to dismiss, was suf-
ficient to preserve the plaintiff's right of appeal.' 5
In a slightly different situation, when an appellate court reverses
the trial court on an issue of law, and there is nothing in the record
38. Dehkordi v. Kelley, 21 Va. Cir. 375 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990) (court also held
that a motion objecting to venue must state where venue would be proper).
39. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:25.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
41. Langley v. Meredith, 237 Va. 55, 61-62, 376 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1989).
42. 241 Va. 40, 400 S.E.2d 164 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 43, 400 S.E.2d at 166.
45. Id. at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 167; see also Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 773, 232
S.E.2d 778, 780 (1977) (holding that the main purpose of requiring timely, specific objec-
tions is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented,
thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals).
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to contradict the plaintiff's evidence supporting his claim, section
8.01-681 of the Code" allows the appellate court to enter final
judgment without the necessity of further proceedings.41 However,
in reversing the trial court, the appellate court may not reweigh
the evidence or substitute its factual judgment for that of the trial
court.4
After twenty-one days from entry of a final order, the trial court
loses its jurisdiction to disturb the judgment,49 except under the
special circumstances described in section 8.01-428 of the Code. °
Neither the filing of post-trial motions, the filing of post-judgment
motions, nor the court's consideration of such motions is sufficient
to toll the twenty-one-day finality period or the thirty-day notice
of appeal period set forth in Rule 5:9.51
V. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are often
confusing to practitioners. To help alleviate this confusion, the su-
preme court attempted, in Snead v. Bendigo, 2 to define the dis-
tinction between the two defenses. According to the court, a party
may avail himself of the defense of res judicata where he can show
that a given cause of action or issue has been, or could have been,
litigated in a previous lawsuit.5 3 Collateral estoppel, on the other
hand, applies when different causes of action are involved.54 Under
the principles of collateral estoppel, a party cannot re-litigate any
issue of fact which was "actually litigated" in a previous action,
46. VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-681 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
47. Tyson's Int'l v. Board of Supervisors, 241 Va. 5, 400 S.E.2d 151 (1991).
48. School Bd. v. Beasley, 238 Va. 44, 380 S.E.2d 884 (1989) (supreme court reversed
judgment of court of appeals).
49. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:1.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
51. School Bd. v. Caudill Rowlett Scott Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1989);
see VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:5(a) and 5A:3(a).
52. 240 Va. 399, 397 S.E.2d 849 (1990); see also Pugh v. Minter, 21 Va. Cir. 263 (City of
Charlottesville Cir. Ct. 1990) (res judicata and collateral estoppel distinguished).
53. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. at 401, 397 S.E.2d at 850 (emphasis in original);
see also Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. v. City of Va. Beach, 240 Va. 209, 396 S.E.2d 656
(1990); Nottingham v. Weld, 237 Va. 416, 377 S.E.2d 621 (1989) (previous federal court
action barred claim); Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 222, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1986); Bates
v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202 S.E.2d 917, 920-21 (1974); Mowry v. City of Va. Beach, 198
Va. 205, 211, 93 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1956); Darling v. Upton, 21 Va. Cir. 161 (County of Fairfax
Cir. Ct. 1990) (suit held barred by res judicata where claim should have been litigated as
compulsory counterclaim in previous federal court action).
54. Snead, 240 Va. at 401, 397 S.E.2d at 850.
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provided that the issue was "essential to a valid, final, personal
judgment in the first action. '55
Snead involved a physician who obtained a judgment for unpaid
fees in general district court. At the trial, the defendant told the
court that he did not owe the debt because, when treating the de-
fendant's broken leg, the physician had caused him more damage
than good. Without ruling on the issue of the propriety of the phy-
sician's treatment, the court entered judgment for the physician.56
When the patient later filed a medical malpractice action against
the same physician in circuit court, the physician argued that the
patient was collaterally estopped from raising the issue of the phy-
sician's negligence because it had been previously litigated in the
general district court and decided adversely to the patient.5 The
trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the malpractice case.58
The supreme court, reversing the trial court, held that defenses
to affidavits of account must be in writing.59 Thus, the defendant's
oral allegations of the physician's negligence were not properly "in
issue" at the general district court trial.60 Since a matter not in
issue cannot be "actually litigated," the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel did not apply and the medical malpractice case was there-
fore remanded for further proceedings.6 '
In another case, the supreme court held that a second action is
not barred by the doctrine of res judicata where the first action
was erroneously dismissed before the plaintiff had an opportunity
to prove the elements of his case.6 2 When the first action is re-
versed on appeal, no final judgment exists, and therefore the prin-
ciples of res judicata do not apply.63
55. Id.
56. Id. at 400-401, 397 S.E.2d at 850.
57. Id. at 401, 397 S.E.2d at 850.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 402, 396 S.E.2d at 851. Section 8.01-28 of the Code, effective July 1, 1991, now
provides that defendant's denial, in response to plaintiff's affidavit and statement of ac-
count, need not be in writing; thus appearing to reverse the holding in Snead v. Bendigo.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-28 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
60. Snead, 240 Va. at 402, 397 S.E.2d at 851.
61. Id.
62. Lucas v. HCMF Corp., 238 Va. 446, 384 S.E.2d 92 (1989).
63. Id. at 450-451; 384 S.E.2d at 94.
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VI. SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 8.01-271.1 OF THE CODE OF
VIRGINIA
Since the enactment of section 8.01-271.1 of the Code64 in 1987,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has issued two opinions interpreting
the act.6 5 In both of those cases the supreme court reversed the
sanctions which had been imposed by the trial court pursuant to
the act.
In the first case, Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors,6 the court
held that when determining whether an attorney has violated the
"warranted by existing law" portion of section 8.01-271.1 of the
Code, the court must apply an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.6 7 In other words, the party seeking sanctions must show that
"a competent attorney, after reasonable inquiry could not have
formed a reasonable belief that [his client's] contention was war-
ranted by existing law."68 The court further stated that any doubts
regarding the reasonableness of a claim should be resolved in favor
of the attorney against whom sanctions are sought; and that the
court should avoid using the wisdom of hindsight in its decision. 9
When the supreme court applied this objective standard in Tul-
lidge, it concluded that under legal precedent existing at the time
the appellant attorney presented his case, he could have reasona-
bly believed that his client had a valid claim. The court, therefore,
reversed the trial court's sanctions against the attorney. 0
In County of Prince William v. Rau,71 decided the same day as
Tullidge, the supreme court applied the same objective standard to
a party litigant as it did to an attorney. Again, the court concluded
that sanctions imposed by the trial court were improper because
the party had acted reasonably under the law and the existing
64. Section 8.01-271.1 of the Code requires attorneys and parties not represented by
counsel to certify to the court that all pleadings and motions are made in good faith and not
for any improper purpose. The statute requires the judge, upon finding a violation, to im-
pose appropriate sanctions, including reasonable attorneys' fees, upon the offending party,
or lawyer, or both. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
65. Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. 611, 391 S.E.2d 288 (1990); County of Prince
William v. Rau, 239 Va. 616, 391 S.E.2d 290 (1990).
66. Id.
67. Tullidge, 239 Va. at 614, 391 S.E.2d at 289-90.
68. Id. at 614, 391 S.E.2d at 290.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 614-615, 391 S.E.2d at 290.
71. 239 Va. 616, 391 S.E.2d 290 (1990).
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circumstances. 2
In recent years, the circuit courts have imposed sanctions
against: (1) an attorney who repeatedly filed motions not well
grounded in fact or in law;7 3 (2) a plaintiff who filed a frivolous
custody suit;7 4 and, (3) an attorney who prosecuted a medical mal-
practice claim against a hospital without expert testimony to sup-
port his client's claim.75 However, a court denied sanctions in a
case where the plaintiff's attorney filed suit against the wrong de-
fendant because the attorney was found to have reasonably relied
on information furnished by his client. 6
Also, circuit courts have held that a motion for sanctions under
section 8.01-271.1 of the Code survives a nonsuit of the underlying
action.7 7 Thus, a party may seek sanctions under the act in an ac-
tion separate from that in which the allegedly prohibited conduct
took place. 8
VII. CHANGES IN THE SUPREME COURT RULES
This section of the article reviews the important changes in the
Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia that apply to civil practice and
procedure during the period from July 1, 1989 to July 1, 1991.
Effective September 1, 1990, Rule 4:1,7' which covers the general
discovery provisions, underwent extensive modifications. First,
Rule 4:1(b)(1)80 now gives the circuit court broad authority to re-
strict and control discovery in civil litigation. It provides that the
court shall limit the frequency or extent of use of all discovery
methods whenever the court determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from a more convenient, less burdensome or less
expensive source; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample op-
72. Id. at 620-621, 391 S.E.2d at 293.
73. Bremner, Baber and Janus v. Morrissey, 19 Va. Cir. 324 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct.
1990).
74. Day v. Day, 19 Va. Cir. 14 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1989).
75. Dolan v. Barnes, 19 Va. Cir. 76 (City of Alexandria Cir. Ct. 1989).
76. Frantz's Auto. Serv. v. Crabtree, 21 Va. Cir. 443 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990).
77. Community Bank & Trust Co. of Va. v. Turk, 20 Va. Cir. 378 (County of Loudoun
Cir. Ct. 1990).
78. Surovell, Jackson, Colten & Dugan, P.C. v. Dawson, 18 Va. Cir. 392 (County of
Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1990).
79. VA. Sup. CT. R 4:1.
80. Id. 4:1(b)(1).
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portunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in contro-
versy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation.8'
The court may impose limitations under Rule 4:1(b)(1) upon its
own motion or by motion of a party.82
Prior to this amendment to Rule 4:1(b)(1), the court was not au-
thorized to limit the use and frequency of discovery, except under
special circumstances where protective orders were mandated by
Rule 4:1(c).8 3
Second, Rule 4:1(g)8 4 was rewritten to authorize the trial court to
impose sanctions similar to those provided for in section 8.01-271.1
of the Code. 5 Due to the importance of Rule 4:1(g), it is set forth
in its entirety as follows:
(g) Signing of Discovery Requests, Responses, and Objections. -
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made
by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the request, response, or objection, and state the party's ad-
dress. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certifica-
tion that the signer has read the request, response, or objection, and
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these
Rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause un-
necessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3)
not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount
in controversy and the importance of the issues at stake in the liti-
gation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to
the attention of the party making the request, response, or objec-
tion, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with re-




85. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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spect to it until it is signed.
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, re-
sponse, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.86
Although all pleadings, including discovery documents, are still
governed by section 8.01-271.1 of the Code, Rule 4:1(g) imposes
additional obligations and requirements for certification of discov-
ery requests, responses and objections.8 7
In another area, Rule 3:17,88 which governs judgments by de-
fault, was amended effective September 1, 1990. The rule now pro-
vides that when a defendant fails to file responsive pleadings
within the required time, he is not entitled to notice of any further
proceedings in the case, "except that written notice of any further
proceedings shall be given to defendant's counsel of record, if
any."'89 Prior to the amendment, it was not necessary to notify the
defendant's counsel of record of further proceedings when the de-
fendant was in default. "Counsel of record" is defined in Rule 1:5.90
As of July 1, 1989, Rule 5:19 was amended to provide that on
appeal to the supreme court the appellee may, "without waiving
oral argument," file a reply brief addressing any cross-error as-
signed to the trial court.9 1 Despite this addition, the rule retains
the language of former Rule 5:19, which provided that when an
appellee files a brief in opposition to the petition for appeal, the
appellee waives oral argument.92
Rule 5:11(b) was amended to clarify that on appeal to the su-
'preme court the appellant must, within five days after the tran-
script is filed, give written notice to all counsel of the date the
transcript was filed, and file a copy of that notice with the trial
86. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(g).
87. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991) with VA. Sup. CT. R. 4.1(g).
88. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3:17.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. 1:5.
91. Id. 5:19 (emphasis added).
92. Compare Id. 5:19 (Repl. Vol. 1991) with Id. 5:19 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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court clerk.93 However, when the transcript is filed prior to the en-
try of judgment, the appellant must give notice within five days
after the notice of appeal is filed.9 4 The same amendment was
made to Rule 5A:8(b) for appeals to the court of appeals.9 5
Rule 5A:8(a) was also amended, effective January 1, 1990, to al-
low a court of appeals judge to extend the sixty-day period for fil-
ing of a transcript where good cause is shown, provided that the
appellant motions the court for the extension within sixty days af-
ter entry of the final judgment. 6 Also, Rule 5A:8, effective April 1,
1991, provides that the mailing provisions of Rule 5A:3(c) do not
apply to Rule 5A:8 motions for extension of time to file the
transcript.9 7
An amendment to Rule 5:11(d) dovetails with the change in the
Rule for filing of transcripts. The amendment provided that where
the transcript is filed prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, the
notice of errors or deficiencies in the transcript must be filed
within ten days after the notice of appeal has been filed with the
trial clerk. 8 The same amendment was made to Rule 5A:8(d) for
appeals to the court of appeals.9
Effective July 1, 1991, Rule 5:17(c) is amended to provide that if
a petition for appeal does not contain assignments of error, the ap-
peal may be dismissed. The court will only take notice of errors
assigned in the petition.100
VIII. OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGISLATION AND CASE
LAW
Important legislation and case law has developed in many other
areas of law pertaining to civil practice and procedure. For in-
stance, pursuant to section 8.01-229(B)(2) of the Code, where a
plaintiff files suit against a defendant in a timely manner, and the
defendant subsequently dies, the plaintiff may amend the suit to
name the decedent's personal representative either before the expi-
ration of the applicable limitation, or within one year after the
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qualification of such personal representative, whichever' occurs
later.101
Section 8.01-6 of the Code allows an amendment, correcting a
failure to name a proper party, to relate back to the original filing
date of the pleading for purposes of the statute of limitations.
10 2
However, the back-dated amendment is permissible only where:
(1) the added party received notice of the action within the origi-
nal limitation period; (2) the added party is not prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits; (3) the added party knew or
should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
him; and, (4) the amended pleading asserts a claim arising out of
the same situation.103
As of July 1, 1990, the statute of limitations will be tolled during
any period where the defendant obstructs filing of a suit.104 Previ-
ously, the tolling provision applied only where the defendant
avoided service after the plaintiff filed action. 0 5 "Obstruction" of
filing; however, is not defined by the new statute.106
In actions for injuries resulting from sexual abuse which oc-
curred during the plaintiff's infancy or incompetency, section 8.01-
249 of the Code now provides that the two-year statute of limita-
tion period does not begin to run until the plaintiff is informed by
a physician or psychologist of the abuse and that it caused the in-
jury.10 7 However, the action must be brought within ten years of
either the last act of abuse or the removal of the disability, incom-
petency or infancy, whichever is later.108
Section 8.01-326.1 of the Code provides that a statutory agent
(e.g. Secretary of the Commonwealth, Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, State Corporation Commission) who is served with process or
notice must mail a copy of the process or notice to the defendant
and file a certificate of compliance with the court. The statute fur-
ther specifies that service is effective as of the date the certificate
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1991).
102. Id. § 8.01-6 (Cure. Supp. 1991).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 8.01-229(D).
105. Id. § 8.01-229(D) (Repl. Vol. 1984), amended by id. § 8.01-229(D) (Cum. Supp.
1991).
106. Id. § 8.01-229(D) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
107. Id. § 8.01-249.
108. Id.
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is filed with the appropriate clerk.10 9
In the general district court, the follow-up mailing requirement
for posted service may be satisfied by mailing a copy of the plead-
ing before or after filing it in the court.110 In the circuit court, the
follow-up mailing requirement is satisfied by mailing a copy of the
notice of motion for judgment and motion for default judgment,
along with a notice that a default judgment may be entered upon
expiration of the statutory period."'
Section 8.01-377.1 of the Code now authorizes partial summary
judgment on severable, uncontested issues." 2 However, this is not
a change in procedure because prior to the statute's enactment,
this authority already existed under Supreme Court Rules 2:21 and
3:18.11-1
In a more specific area, interested insurance carriers, the dece-
dent's personal representative, and/or any potential defendant to a
wrongful death claim may petition the court to approve a compro-
mise of the claim." 4 Previously, only the personal representative
could file such a petition." 5 Similarly, interested insurers may re-
quest court approval of a compromise in claims involving a per-
sonal injury of a person under a disability.11 6 The General Assem-
bly passed these amendments to avoid the potential ethical
problem with having defense counsel draft pleadings on behalf of
plaintiffs not represented by counsel." 7
Section 8.01-424 of the Code has also been amended to allow a
judge, when approving a structured settlement for a minor, to des-
ignate that payments be placed in trust with a court-designated
trustee - a parent or guardian. The trust may be terminated after
the minor reaches the age of majority."'
In the area of discovery, section 8.01-420.4 of the Code autho-
rizes depositions to be taken in a county or city within the Com-
monwealth where a non-party witness resides, is employed, or has
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-326.1.
110. Id. § 8.01-296(2)(b).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 8.01-377.1.
113. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 2:21, 3:18.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-55 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
115. Id. § 8.01-55 (Repl. Vol. 1984), amended by id. § 8.01-55 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
116. Id. § 8.01-424 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
117. DIGEST OF AcTs OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, at 6 (1991).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
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his principal place of business." 9 However, this statute conflicts
with Supreme Court Rule 4:5(al), which requires that such deposi-
tions be taken where the suit is pending or in an adjacent city or
county, except by agreement of the parties or designation by the
court where good cause for taking the depositions in another loca-
tion is shown.120 It is presumed that section 8.01-420.4 of the Code
will control to the extent that it conflicts with Rule 4:5(al).
Section 8.01-384.2 of the Code allows parties, without court or-
der, to waive all the deadlines for discovery and responsive plead-
ings in civil litigation which are mandated by the Rules of Su-
preme Court of Virginia, unless the court had previously entered
an order establishing deadlines for filing or discovery.12
Also, the plaintiff now has authority to motion the court to set
aside a default judgment or decree pro confesso if the judgment
was proved satisfied. 122 Prior to July 1, 1991, only the judgment
debtor could make this motion. 23
In the area of medical malpractice, an amendment to section
8.01-581.9 of the Code specifies that the sixty-day tolling period for
the statute of limitations begins to run when the notice of rescis-
sion of a request for a medical malpractice review panel is posted
by registered or certified mail to the claimant or health care pro-
vider, or is delivered by registered or certified mail to the chief
justice of the supreme court.12 Additionally, the General Assembly
amended the definition of "health care provider" to include part-
nerships, so long as all of the partners are licensed health care
providers. 25
The medical malpractice cap, now set at one million dollars per
claim,'12 has been upheld as constitutional. 27 The cap applies
when the injury is caused by the concurring negligence of two or
more health care providers,' 2 regardless of the number of legal
theories upon which the claim is based. 29
119. Id. § 8.01-420.4.
120. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:5(al).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
122. Id. § 8.01-428(A).
123. Id. § 8.01-428(A) (Repl. Vol. 1984), amended by id. § 8.01-428(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
124. Id. § 8.01-581.9 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
125. Id. § 8.01-581.1.
126. Id. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
127. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosp., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
128. See Id.
129. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
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In an action on contract or note in the general district court,
section 8.01-28 of the Code13 0 clarifies that a defendant's denial in
response to the plaintiff's affidavit and statement of account need
not be in writing. The General Assembly apparently passed this
amendment in response to Snead v. Bandigo,131 where the supreme
court held that the plea under oath required by the statute must
be in writing.
Finally, in the area of evidence, copies of documents, including
checks and drafts, may now be admitted into evidence, in lieu of
originals, if they have been received or transmitted and copied in
the regular course of business by a member of the profession or a
business, regardless of whether the original exists or not.132 Fur-
thermore, section 8.01-413 of the Code provides that copies of
medical records kept by any health care provider can be obtained
by a patient and his attorney and are admissible into evidence in
civil actions, if the records are otherwise admissible under the rules
of evidence. 33
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-28 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
131. 240 Va. 399, 402, 397 S.E.2d 849, 851 (1990).
132. VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-391 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
133. Id. § 8.01-413.
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